Civil Rights—The Civil Rights Attorney\u27s Fees Awards Act of 1976—The Amount of Success Determines the Award by McDaniel, Lucinda
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 7 Issue 2 Article 4 
1984 
Civil Rights—The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 
1976—The Amount of Success Determines the Award 
Lucinda McDaniel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lucinda McDaniel, Civil Rights—The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976—The Amount of 
Success Determines the Award, 7 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 421 (1984). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol7/iss2/4 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen Law 
Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
CIVIL RIGHTS-THE CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS ACT
OF 1976--THE AMOUNT OF SUCCESS DETERMINES THE AWARD. Hens-
ley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983).
Patients involuntarily confined at the Forensic Unit of the Fulton
State Hospital in Fulton, Missouri, filed suit against officials of the Fo-
rensic Unit and members of the Missouri Mental Health Commission
alleging that these persons violated the patients' constitutional right to
treatment.1 The district court held that an involuntarily committed pa-
tient had a constitutional right to minimally adequate treatment2 and
found constitutional violations in five of six general areas. However, the
court found staffing, the sixth general area, to be minimally adequate.
The plaintiffs then filed a request for attorney's fees pursuant to
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 19763 seeking payment
for 2,295 hours at rates from forty to sixty-five dollars per hour. They
also requested that the fee be enhanced, by using a factor of thirty to
fifty percent, for a total award of between $195,000 and $225,000.
The district court held that the plaintiffs were prevailing parties
under section 1988 of title 42 of the United States Code even though
they succeeded on only five of the six general claims. The court refused
to eliminate from the award of attorney's fees the hours spent on the
unsuccessful claim, holding that the plaintiffs obtained significant over-
all relief The court, however, did reduce the award by eliminating a
number of hours claimed by an inexperienced attorney who failed to
keep accurate records and by refusing to adopt the enhancement factor
to increase the award."
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 5 in an unpublished
decision, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
1. 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1936 (1983). Patients alleged constitutional violations in the areas of
physical environment; individual treatment plans; least restrictive environment; visitation, tele-
phone, and mail privileges; seclusion and restraint; and staffing. The lawsuit was originally filed as
a three-count complaint challenging constitutionality of treatment and conditions, placement in
maximum security without procedural due process, and non-payment of patients performing insti-
tution-maintaining labor. The second charge was resolved by a consent decree and the third
charge was mooted when patients were paid for their labor pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1938). The lawsuit was subsequently dismissed and refiled as a two-count
complaint which was later amended to the present one-count complaint.
2. Eckerhart v. Hensley, 475 F. Supp. 908 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
4. 475 F. Supp. 908.
5. Eckerhart v. Hensley, 664 F.2d 294 (8th Cir. 1981).
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Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983).
Prevailing parties have historically been awarded costs by statute.
Early French, Roman, and Swedish law provided for attorney's fees
awards to the prevailing party as an item of compensatory damage or
cost necessary to a full and just recovery.6 In England, the philosophy
developed that the unsuccessful party should pay the expenses incurred
by the victorious party.7 This theory led in 1278 to the passage of the
Statute of Gloucester 8 which provided for all reasonable legal expendi-
tures of the prevailing plaintiff to be paid by the defendant, including
his attorney's fees. By 1607, similar costs were granted to prevailing
defendants, 9 so that by the time of the American Revolution, English
courts were awarding costs, including attorney's fees, to the prevailing
party.
Due to a distrust of lawyers in colonial America, early colonists
did not choose to promote the economic health of the profession by
allowing courts to award attorney's fees to a prevailing party.10 Follow-
ing the American Revolution, a conscious effort was made to purge the
American legal system of English traditions, thus American courts did
not adopt the English theory of full compensation for the wronged
party, and fees never became part of the costs awarded."
This "American Rule" was established as early as 1796 when the
Supreme Court held that fees were not recoverable without statutory
authorization. 2 When the withholding of attorney's fees proved unjust,
the federal courts, as an exercise of their equitable powers, created ex-
ceptions to the rule that each party must pay his expenses of
litigation.'3
One such judge-created exception to the American Rule was the
"Common Fund Doctrine."" Where a plaintiff successfully maintained
a suit that benefited a group in the same manner as himself, he was
awarded attorney's fees,"' since allowing members of the group to ob-
tain full benefit from the plaintiff's efforts without contributing equally
6. Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L.
REV. 636, 639 (1974).
7. Id. at 639.
8. 6 Edw. 1, ch. 1 (1275).
9. 4 Jac. 1, ch. 3 (1607).
10. Comment, supra note 6, at 641.
11. Id.
12. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
13. Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939) (explaining that the power to
award fees is part of the original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation).
14. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882).
15. Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
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to the litigation expenses enriched them unjustly at the plaintiff's ex-
pense. 16 Because the plaintiff's success allowed others in his class to
recover from the same defendant, the others were forced to contribute
to the costs of the suit by an order reimbursing the plaintiff from the
defendant's assets out of which their recoveries would have to come. 17
Another exception which allowed an award of attorney's fees to a
successful party occurred when a suit was brought in bad faith, vexa-
tiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons."8 The underlying rationale
of fee shifting in these cases was punitive and the essential element in
triggering the award of fees was bad faith on the part of the unsuccess-
ful litigant.'9
A final exception created by the courts to allow fee awards was the
"private attorney general" theory. 0 In a 1943 case, 2 Judge Jerome
Frank coined the phrase "private attorney general" to describe the
plaintiff who by vindicating his civil rights benefited the entire commu-
nity. 2 Private attorney general cases were brought under the recon-
struction era Civil Rights Act2" which did not specifically provide for
an award of fees, but courts permitted recovery through analogy to
modern civil rights statutes which expressly authorized awards of attor-
ney's fees.24 Since congressional policy encouraged private enforcement
of personal rights, federal courts allowed an award of attorney's fees to
civil rights plaintiffs gaining a judgment which benefited the public in
general, even though no award may have been authorized by Congress.
This practice of awarding attorney's fees without congressional au-
thority in cases brought under earlier civil rights acts was rejected in
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society.2 5 After ruling for
the plaintiff, the Court disallowed the requested award of attorney's
fees since it did not fall within any of the exceptions to the general
16. Id. at 392.
17. Id. at 393.
18. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex. rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974);
Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
19. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973).
20. Witt, The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 13 URa. LAW 589 (1981).
21. Associated Indus., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707
(1943).
22. Id. at 704; Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts,
122 U. PA. L. REv. 636, 658 (1974).
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983, 1985-1986 (1970).
24. Fioretti & Convery, Attorney's Fees Under The Civil Rights Act-A Time for Change,
16 J. MAR. L. Rav. 261 (1983).
25. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
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"American Rule. ' 26 The court found no bad faith or common benefit2 7
and rejected the "private attorney general" theory as an invasion of the
legislature's province.2 8 This rejection of the inherent equitable power
of the courts to award fees when the plaintiffs were acting as "private
attorney generals" and the placement of authorization to make fee
awards in Congress, directly led to the passage of the Civil Rights At-
torney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.29
The text of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 197630
is brief and straightforward, 31 as is the purpose of the Act: to provide
attorney's fees as part of the remedy to prevailing parties seeking to
enforce their civil rights through acts passed by Congress since 1866.32
Drawing on the fee award provisions of the civil rights law, 3 Congress
formulated the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act to award fees
to those individuals successfully vindicating their civil rights.34 Al-
though this Congressional action seemed to be a clear mandate to
award prevailing parties reasonable fees, much confusion existed fol-
lowing the passage of the Fees Awards Act as to the meaning of "pre-
vailing party" and "reasonable fee." 3
Congress clearly left the determination of the prevailing party to
the discretion of the district court; 36 however, district courts applied
varying standards in making that determination. District courts in the
Third37 and Fifth 8 Circuits required the plaintiff to be successful on
the central issue and acquire the primary relief sought to be considered
26. Id. at 245.
27. Id. at 246.
28. Id. at 271.
29. Witt, supra note 20.
30. 42 U.S.C. §1988 (1976).
31. The Act states: "In any action or proceeding to enforce ... [civil rights] . . . the court
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attor-
ney's fee as part of the costs." Id.
32. S. REP. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5908.
33. Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b) and 2000e-
5(k); Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c); the Emergency School Aid
Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617; the Equal Employment Amendments of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
16(b); and the Voting Rights Act Extension of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e).
34. See supra note 32.
35. Note, Awards of Attorney's Fees in the Federal Courts, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 277, 292
(1982).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
37. Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981).
38. Espino v. Besteiro, 708 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1983); Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458
(5th Cir. 1981).
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the prevailing party. However, district courts in the Ninth"9 and First40
Circuits found a prevailing party to be one who succeeded on any sig-
nificant issue which achieved some of the benefit the parties sought in
bringing the suit.
Some courts considered a party to have prevailed even when a con-
sent decree was entered,41 a settlement was made,'2 or the issue was
mooted.4  A party might even have been said to have prevailed al-
though he did not gain substantial relief if his lawsuit were a catalyst
to reform or eliminate offensive practices."
Besides the uncertainty as to who was a prevailing party, the de-
termination of a reasonable fee was also unclear. The 1968 case of
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises5 set the basic standard to be used
when determining the amount of fees to be awarded to a prevailing
party. This case held that one obtaining relief under the Civil Rights
Acts should generally recover attorney's fees unless special circum-
stances would render such an award unjust. 46 Newman was coupled
with the later case of Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis
City Schools47 to create the Newman/Northcross doctrine. 48 This doc-
trine interpreted Congressional intent as allowing an award of fees for
all time reasonably expended on a case, including hours expended on
unsuccessful research or litigation, unless the positions asserted were
frivolous or in bad faith. 9
Two cases gave explicit instructions as to how to calculate attor-
ney's fees. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.50 listed twelve
39. Bartholomew v. Watson, 665 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1982).
40. Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 582 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978).
41. Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980); Johnson v. University College of the Uni-
versity of Alabama in Birmingham, 706 F.2d 1205 (11th Cir. 1983).
42. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980); Fulps v. City of Springfield, Tenn., 715 F.2d
1088 (6th Cir. 1983); Iranian Students Ass'n v. Edwards, 604 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1979).
43. Doe v. Marshall, 622 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 993 (1981); Bagby
v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1979).
44. Fields v. City of Tarpon Springs, Fla., 721 F.2d 318 (1lth Cir. 1983); Othen v. Ann
Arbor School Bd., 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983); Ross v. Horn, 598 F.2d 1312 (3d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir.
1970).
45. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
46. Id. at 402.
47. 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980).
48. These cases were coupled because they interpreted identical attorney's fees provisions in
similar civil rights statutes: Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-20000a- 3
(1976) and Emergency School Aid Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976) (repealed 1979).
49. 611 F.2d 624, 636 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980).
50. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). Johnson lists the following factors to use as guidelines to
determine the amount of attorney's fees to award:
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considerations to be used as guidelines for determining a reasonable
fee, while Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Stan-
dard Sanitary Corp.51 used a four step procedure to calculate a fee
award. 52 While formulas for awarding fees seemed to simplify the
award process, the district courts still had to determine not only the
number of hours actually devoted to the successful claims, but also
whether it was reasonably necessary to spend those hours in order to
perform the legal services.53
Because of varying applications of the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act, some parties were receiving fees when they prevailed
to a lesser extent than those who were denied fees. A district court in
California sought to clarify the relationship among prevailing parties,
reasonable fees, and amount of success required in Stanford Daily v.
Zurcher.51 In this decision, the court explained that attorneys must ex-
plore fully every aspect of the case including issues that are ultimately
rejected by a court, and the mere fact that the litigants did not succeed
in obtaining a judgment on all of the claims asserted did not mean that
time spent pursuing those claims should be automatically disallowed. 55
A court should consider the relationship of the claims that resulted in
the judgment to the claims that were rejected and the degree to which
1. The time and labor required.
2. The novelty and difficulty of the questions.
3. The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
4. The preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case.
5. The customary fee.
6. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
7. Time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances.
8. The amount involved and the results obtained.
9. The experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys.
10. The undesirability of the case.
11. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
12. Awards in similar cases.
S. REP. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976) relied on these twelve factors when consider-
ing the calculation of attorney's fees.
51. 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973).
52. Id. at 167. Lindy uses the following four step procedure to determine the amount of a fee
award:
I. Ascertain the hours spent and the manner in which they were spent.
2. Assess the value of the service.
3. Consider the contingent nature of success.
4. Evaluate the quality of the work performed.
53. Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483, 487 (3d Cir. 1978).
54. 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974), affid, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
55. Id. at 684.
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an investigation of all issues contributed to the case as a whole."
Since confusion surrounded the proper application of the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, the United States Supreme Court
in Hensley v. Eckerhart57 sought to clarify when a partially prevailing
plaintiff could recover an attorney's fee for legal services on unsuccess-
ful claims" by providing a formula for the calculation of the fee. The
Court held that the award allowed the prevailing party was to be based
on a calculation of the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied
by a reasonable hourly rate. This base fee was then subject to adjust-
ment upward or downward according to the results obtained." The
Court considered the extent of the plaintiffs success to be the crucial
factor in determining the proper amount of an award of attorney's
fees, a0 and established a two-pronged test.
First, if the suit contained unrelated claims, no attorney's fees
would be awarded for any unsuccessful claim."1 The Court followed the
reasoning of Davis v. County of Los Angeles6 which held that work on
an unsuccessful claim could not be deemed to have been expended in
pursuit of the ultimate result achieved.63 Since Congress intended to
limit awards to only prevailing parties, the Court required that any un-
related claim be treated as if it were raised in a separate lawsuit and, if
unsuccessful, receive no fee award. 64
Second, even when the claims were related, if only limited success
was achieved, the attorney's fees would be reduced to be reasonable
according to the results obtained.6 5 In a case involving related claims,
the Court focused on the significance of the overall relief obtained
when awarding attorney's fees.66 If a plaintiff obtained excellent re-
sults, the Court suggested that an enhanced award could be justified;
56. Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1382 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 453
U.S. 950 (1981).
57. 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983).
58. Id. at 1935.
59. Id. at 1940.
60. Id. at 1941.
61. Id. at 1940. See also Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. 3457 (1984); Sisco v. J.S. Alberici
Constr. Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1984); Citizens Council of Delaware County v. Brinegar,
741 F.2d 584 (3d Cir. 1984).
62. Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 E.P.D. § 9444 at 5049 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
63. Id.
64. 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1940 (1983). See also Blum v. Stenson, 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984).
65. Id. at 1940. See also Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126 (1 1th Cir.
1984); Trevant v. City of Tampa, 741' F.2d 336 (11 th Cir. 1984); New York City Unemployed
and Welfare Council v. Brezenoff, 742 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1984).
66. Id. See also Rosenbrough Monument Co. v. Memorial Par Cemetary, 736 F.2d 441 (8th
Cir. 1984).
1984]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
however, if a plaintiff achieved only partial success, the basic computa-
tion of hours multiplied by rate might be excessive.17 The Court re-
duced the attorney's fees awarded in this situation even when the plain-
tiff's claims were interrelated, nonfrivolous, and raised in good faith. 8
Because of the district court's superior understanding of the litiga-
tion, the Court placed in the district court the discretion to determine
the amount of the fee award but required the district court to provide a
clear explanation of its determination of a fee award based on the re-
sults obtained in the case.69 Because the district court in Hensley v.
Eckerhart did not properly consider the relationship between the extent
of success and the amount of the fee award, the case was remanded. 0
Justice Brennan, in his dissent 7 1 pointed out several potential
problems with the ruling. Attorneys in civil rights cases often advance a
number of related legal claims in order to give the plaintiff the best
possible chance of achieving substantial relief.72 Because legal claims
are often intertwined, he found it virtually impossible to determine how
much time was spent on individual claims.73
Justice Brennan also argued that, besides the results obtained, the
time-value of money and the contingency of payment for civil rights
litigation must be considered.7 4 Hours multiplied by rate, then product
against result was not an adequate evaluation.7
Justice Brennan's strongest argument against the decision was that
it merely continued litigation in a case in which the merits were de-
cided years ago. 76 Because the district court determined that the plain-
tiffs had prevailed to an extent justifying fees for all hours reasonably
spent, Justice Brennan saw the remand as frustrating the policies of
section 1988 by preventing the timely payment of attorney's fees. 77 Ap-
prehension concerning the delay and expense caused by appellate litiga-
tion of attorney's fees was likely to discourage civil rights suits, an
anomalous result of a statute designed to attract competent counsel to
civil rights cases. 6
67. Id. at 1941.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1943.
71. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 1947.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1947-48.
76. Id. at 1950.
77. Id. at 1951.
78. Id.
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Hensley v. Eckerhart does achieve the Court's purpose of clarify-
ing exactly how successful a party must be to receive attorney's fees.
The two-pronged test established to allow fees based on success gives
the basic framework by which courts may award or deny attorney's
fees on a consistent basis. This strict requirement of success in order to
receive attorney's fees will cause attorneys to scrutinize potential civil
rights cases for valid claims worthy of litigation. Issues will be nar-
rowed in future cases and weak claims eliminated since success will be
the standard by which the issues are judged. Though Hensley provides
a framework for district courts to use when exercising their discretion
to award fees, the case also produces several problems.
One problem raised by Hensley is how the Court should evaluate
time reasonably expended on a losing issue. Congressional intent was to
award fees for all time reasonably spent on a case, yet Hensley holds
that fees may not be awarded for time reasonably spent on an unre-
lated issue if that issue is not successful. It seems that, following Hens-
ley, district courts no longer have the power to do equity which they so
long possessed because losing issues are automatically rejected when
figuring the amount of fees to be awarded.
The most disturbing outcome of Hensley v. Eckerhart may be its
deterrance effect. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act was
passed to enable litigants to obtain competent counsel. Prevailing par-
ties were assured attorney's fees, thereby encouraging attorneys to ac-
cept civil rights cases. The action of the Court in Hensley may discour-
age attorneys from accepting civil rights cases which seem risky
because limited success will mean limited remuneration. 79 In addition,
the prospect of prolonged litigation concerning the amount of attorney's
fees to be awarded, carried on long after the completion of the princi-
pal case, may deter attorney's from engaging in civil rights litigation. If
this occurs, congressional intent will be thwarted and those parties too
poor to pay counsel will not be able to litigate their civil rights claims.
Attorneys evaluating potential civil rights cases should examine
the issues and weigh the potential for success in the litigation, for,
under Hensley v. Eckerhart, the amount of success will determine the
award of fees.
Lucinda McDaniel
79. See Fast v. School Dist. of City of Ladue, 728 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff may
be a prevailing party and still not receive full compensation for all the expense invested in a case).
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